Moral Dependence Thesis (MDT):
Ingroup, Authority, and Purity norms apply exactly when, and exactly because, certain norms encouraging welfare-promotion (especially norms forbidding harming) apply. This is to say that IAP norms exhibit what I'll call normative dependence on welfarepromoting norms. Furthermore, although some people have the intuition that IAP considerations are intrinsically morally relevant independent of their connection to welfare, this intuition is subject to a debunking argument. (This debunking argument basically says that IAP intuitions are mostly-outdated heuristics for welfare-promotion; people who take IAP norms too seriously are blinded to this because of the natural human tendency to treat moralized norms as all-important.) Nevertheless, IAP norms have extrinsic moral importance, as they are not completely outdated for our world; that is the respect in which Haidt is right to defend the conservative moral outlook. This paper could serve as part of an argument that morality is all about welfare promotion (a view sometimes labeled "welfarism" 8 ). But it is not a full argument for welfarism insofar as, for all I say here, other harm-independent subject-matters might be intrinsically morally relevant. To be sure, I suspect that Fairness and Liberty considerations (for example) will turn out to exhibit a normative dependence on welfare similarly to how IAP considerations do. But this is not the place to thoroughly explore such proposals.
This paper is neutral on at least four contested questions. The first is the debate between consequentialists and deontologists. For all I say, deontologists might be right: there might be special constraints against (e.g.) harming certain persons, or against doing the harming oneself, or there might be duties to benefit persons to whom one is specially related. Second, it is neutral regarding whether (e.g.) lying, promise-keeping, or the development of one's talents are morally relevant independent of any connection to the harms or benefits of these practices to anyone. Granted, that view might look more doubtful in light of MDT; but neither am I arguing against that kind of view. Third, this paper is compatible with any cognitivist metaethical stance, according to which moral judgments are capable of being true or false (more will be said about this in §3.) Finally, this paper does not engage in debate about whether there is a distinct or unified psychological pattern in virtue of which attitudes count as 'moral' or 'moralistic'. Our topic is morality in the sense of the norms that have moral force on us.
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Here's a roadmap for the paper. First ( §1), I will clarify the view. Next ( §2), I will support the claim that many other moral norms depend for their moral relevance on their connection to welfare promotion. I will also provide preliminary reasons to hypothesize that virtually all moral agents-including both conservatives and liberals-are at least implicitly committed to that claim. This is some reason to expect IAP norms will also depend on welfare promotion. Third ( §3), I will relay a promising evolutionary story of how IAP norms emerged. This story, I argue, vindicates the view that IAP norms were (extrinsically) useful in ancestral, tribal environments. However, it debunks the view that IAP norms have moral force even when they have no connection to welfare protection. Finally ( §4), I'll explain how tracing IAP's moral import to their welfare-relevance accommodates Haidt's apparently disparate normative commitments, and does so better than any relativist view.
Clarifying the view

Normative Dependence
We often explain the application of certain norms or rules in terms of others. For example, 'the point' of a certain linguistic convention is to disambiguate; that of songwriting advice, the production of aesthetically pleasing songs; of reasoning advice, to form welljustified beliefs. These are examples of what we can call normative dependence-a concept easier illustrated than defined.
Full relations of normative dependence seem to have at least two aspects to them, an asymmetrical explanatory relation and a heuristical relation. Let me illustrate with a chess analogy. The chess stratagem [3] do not triple your pawns depends on the stratagem [2] do not lose material (pieces) relative to your opponent. The latter strategem is "the point" of the former. A chess player committed to not-losing the game prevents her pawns from tripling "for the sake of", "because of" (and only because of) the importance of this for not falling behind in material. [2] is "the (whole) point" of [3] . In turn, the whole point of not losing one's pieces is to comply with the twin supreme objects of chess, 1A] do not allow yourself to be checkmated and 1B] checkmate your opponent.
Similarly, stratagems like [3] are mere rules-of-thumb (heuristics, guidelines): at least approximately, they are to be followed when and only when they are conducive to successfully following the more fundamental stratagem. 11 Suppose by tripling your pawns you can win your opponent's rook: then triple away. The rule against tripling one's pawns is to-be-followed exactly insofar as-i.e., because and only because, and when and only when-it conduces to not falling behind in material.
Below it will be argued that IAP norms exhibit a moral normative dependence on There are good reasons to expect that all competent users of moral terms, including conservatives, are committed to at least four theses. These theses, I suggest, logically commit them to MDT, insofar as MDT is the best explanation of these theses. To discover the theses, we should consider ways that appeals to harm and welfare pervade moral discourse, condemnations, and explanations. I will cite available empirical evidence regarding the intuitions of conservatives; however, the relevant empirical literature is so young that these will have to be considered (plausible) hypotheses. But at the least, our purpose is to show how §3's debunking argument would work if it were strengthened by the present section's hypotheses. Moreover, even if it turns out that conservatives' commitment to one or two of these theses is limited, this will simply leave a little more work for debunking explanations of why they do not share commitment to the theses-explanations which the debunker may well be able to come by.
Let us consider the four theses and then observe how, together, they support MDT. need to explain why (e.g., because someone else has solicited an explanation from her), but
McH
[iii] she cannot find an explanation (or at least is not articulate enough to provide one), yet
[iv] she maintains her judgment anyway. The fact that subjects tend to become dumbfounded is itself evidence that they agree with Explain 1. They seem to be sensing that their moral judgment needs some justification, and that appeal to mere feeling or to IAP will not do the trick, but that appeal to welfare will.
Here someone might worry that this results from some bias, due to pressure either from subjects' interviewers, or from their society's general moral ethos, to appeal to welfare in justifying moral claims. (The worry might continue: suppose subjects had been presented with harmful-but-not-offensive acts, whereupon the interviewer would demand justifications in terms of impurity or betrayal . . . . to be invariably at the core of the explanation. Circularity is the obvious problem, as the appeal to the putatively basic IAP feature may turn out to be explanatorily redundant. A second potential problem is some such views seem to lack an informative account of the putative basic notion-e.g., of 'sin' or 'the natural order'-that is really any thicker or more substantive than mere wrongness; 'because it is sinful' comes to little more than 'because it is just wrong'. Thirdly, these accounts may well take nothing away from the welfarist picture in that all the actions prohibited by a welfarist theory will also end up being prohibited in the same ways and degrees. (Or if they do, they do so on pain of implausibility.) From there, if IAP-based view adds no further moral rules, its rules are simply extensionally equivalent to welfarism. More often, IAP-based views do add further norms, facing the final two worries.
The fourth worry is that these welfare-irrelevant moral rules will depend on highly arbitrary factors-the contingent whims of the gods or the tribal leaders-but that neither moral norms in general, nor harm-based norms in particular, seem to be arbitrary in this way. The fifth problem is that IAP-based, welfare-irrelevant norms tend, in practice, to be based on specious claims. (Take, for instance, the claim that cows are holier than pigs, and that widows must not eat fish. 33 ) Perhaps not all such claims are vague, unsupported, or based on pseudoscience-but many are. Altogether, IAP-based views are prima facie unpromising.
Unifying. The unity of morality on the welfarist picture suggested by MDT is a virtue in at least two ways. First, it helps tidy up an account of morality's emergence, since presumably a system of rules with a single objective emerges more easily than one with multiple objectives. Second, it helps resolve conflicts between subsidiary rules (at least in cases where one rule is clearly more welfare-promoting; more on this below). By contrast, accounts of morality based on more than one IAP norm lack this virtuous unity. (Accounts on which morality has some single point that fits under an I, A, or P heading meet the objections noted in the previous paragraph.)
The potential worry about all this tidiness, of course, is that it will fail to include some subtle details about what morality is about. However, the suggestion that IAP rules serve as heuristics for welfare-promotion promises to allay some of these worries. It, in turn, is supported by: If McH, Explain 1 and 2, and Override were true, they would together provide a good explanation for MDT, as I will now explain. By contrast, the rival view, of morality as having multiple, irreducible subject-matters, accommodates IAPF at the expense of ignoring these four premises. Consider in turn MDT's four parts: IAP norms apply because, only because, when, and only when they are conducive to welfare promotion (especially harm prevention).
Override
The conclusion that IAP norms apply because they are welfare-promoting is identical to the latter half of Explain 1. That all IAP norms apply only because they are welfarepromoting is well explained especially by Explain 2, as well as by Override and McH. IAP norms don't stop explanatory regresses but Harm norms do (Explain 2), so we should conclude that IAP norms can only be fully explained by appeal to welfare-promoting norms.
That Harm norms take precedence over IAP norms (Override) suggests that there will not be cases in which IAP norms override Harm norms and thus need some welfare-independent explanation. Finally, the trans-cultural seriousness of welfare-promoting norms (McH) explains why Harm norms stop the explanatory regresses (and more on this below). Once we admit all this, it seems suspicious to hold that IAP norms are independent points of morality.
It is easy enough to show that IAP norms apply when Harm norms do: it is as easy as imagining actions which violate both IAP and Harm norms (e.g., torturing your boss). We also might support the thesis that IAP norms apply especially when Harm norms do by appeal to the relevant intuitions of conservatives.
36
One place to look would be to the data supporting Explain 1-i.e., to cases where it seems reasonable to ask why IAP norms should not be violated, especially ones where 'because it is harmful' is a satisfying answer. These are cases where the explanatory factor adds something deeper or more significant to the wrongness. Override is also suggestive on this front, as it suggests that even conservatives view IAP norms as applying except when they are overridden by Harm norms. If we can infer from this that harmfulness adds something significant to the wrongness of a violation, we could then expect that when an action is both Harmful and an IAP-violation, harmfulness as an explanatory factor would also do work in that sort of case, i.e., 'especially when' IAPviolations are harmful.
The thesis that IAP norms apply only when Harm norms do seems to be the best explanation of all previous points in this section, taken together. If IAP norms apply only because of their conduciveness to welfare promotion, then there is no reason to comply with IAP norms in cases where they in no way conduce to welfare. Conservatives' ambivalence and dumbfounding about welfare-irrelevant IAP violations is also revealing. Their guts tell them something is disturbing about the cases they are being presented with, and they are motivated to justify the gnawing feeling. But they also surely understand how welfare considerations are a prevalent, obvious, probably primary currency of moral explanations, and the stutters and pauses characteristic of dumbfounding suggest they are least tempted to dismiss the IAP-supporting intuition.
What if we come across a case in which conservatives judge in accordance with an IAP norm but do not feel the need to explain the judgment in welfare-relevant terms, even when pressured to do so? Once we ensure that the subjects do not have some relevant, 36 Of course, the most direct support for the 'especially when' thesis would come from conducting an experiment directly examining the additive effects on conservatives unobvious belief about harms involved, we must conclude that their righteous minds have duped them into assigning excessive importance to a norm which is peripheral to morality.
That is not to say the norm need be unimportant; we can admit that it is in many ways enriching to follow IAP norms, even if they are not-quite-as-important-as-real-morality. The next section explains how this only-somewhat-dismissive attitude can be justified.
Debunking IAP intuitions
What is debunking?
Debunking arguments seek to show that someone's apparent justification for their belief is undermined by some consideration about how that belief was formed. 37 Formally, they look like this:
Causal premise
The appearance to S that x is F is (causally) explained by X.
Epistemic premise X is an unreliable process.
Regarding the present topic, I will argue: 
[i] in the causal premise: the evolution of IAP norms
It is plausible that IAP norms emerged as heuristics for promoting welfare, on any plausible account of the evolution of human cultures. First let us consider Ingroup and Authority (IA) norms-giving two reasons-and then move to Purity norms.
A first reason to think that IA norms are heuristics for welfare promotion is simply that the attitudes they require and recommend just are certain varieties of respect for certain parties' welfare. Loyalty to Ingroup is constituted by the adoption of attitudes that display a willingness to promote the group's welfare, even at the cost of a substantial sacrifice to oneself. 38 Similarly, respect for Authority is constituted by the adoption of attitudes that display a willingness to protect and promote the welfare of a superior, even at a cost to the welfare of the authority's underlings.
A second reason to think that IA norms are heuristics for welfare promotion is that in our evolutionary history they plausibly tended to cause people, organized into tribal groups, to be better off than tribal groups with less stringent IA norms. Haidt tells an evolutionary story of inter-tribe hostility, which invokes cultural group selection:
Humanity's ancestors have been living in groups with at least occasional violent intergroup hostility for most or all of the last seven million years (Boehm, in press). 38 It is a side issue whether the welfare of the group must be understood in terms of the welfare of the individuals who comprise it. Either way, welfare is being promoted.
Human beings therefore can be expected to have many ancient "inside the head" mechanisms (such as for coalitions, tribalism, and territoriality [Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001] ) that co-evolved in more recent times with "outside the head"
cultural creations (such as law, religion, and political institutions) to serve the function of suppressing selfishness and increasing group cohesion, trust, and coordinated action.
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Group cohesion, in an environment of tribal warfare, is important precisely because it protects group members from harms inflicted by enemies, and allows them to secure benefits for the tribe. Coordinated action is enhanced by competent executive decision, which is in turn fostered by a tendency for group members to defer to a competent authority. Haidt's account therefore implies that IA norms function to promote the welfare of tribal ingroups. 40 The point is plausible if Haidt's evolutionary picture is resisted in a couple of ways. First, some readers might resist the appeal to group selection, saying that IA traits really facilitate individual reproductive success rather than group reproductive success (i.e. population growth) or cultural dominance. However, even if so, the means by which individuals would achieve reproductive success would be by avoiding harms and securing resources and other benefits before and during their reproductive stages of life. So IA norms still turn out to be heuristics for welfare promotion. The debate over group selection, or over the thoroughness or sincerity of humans' disposition to sacrifice for their groups, turns out to be a distraction from this paper's thesis. (Moreover, Haidt & Kesebir argue persuasively that 'there is now a widespread consensus that cultural group selection occurs' (p. 818).) Secondly, someone might remind us that welfare protection is not itself the 'goal' of evolution; rather, it is reproductive success (in the case of genetic evolution; and it is something like cultural influence in the case of cultural evolution). However, the protection at least of basic welfare is virtually a necessary condition for reproductive success (as well as for cultural influence). Organisms are prolific to the extent that, before and during their reproductive phases, they are spared death, injury, debilitating pain, etc. and secure resources and other benefits for themselves and their offspring (this is true both for reproductive success and for cultural influence). Furthermore, IA norms just do have respect for and promotion of the welfare of groups and/or their constituents as their explicit goals (to the best of my ethnographic knowledge), with sexual or cultural fertility being construed merely as one important aspect of the group's welfare. once humans domesticated plants and animals and began living in larger and denser groups, they began to engage in large-scale cooperative projects such as building city walls, changing the course of rivers, and conquering their neighbors. . . . The enormous and accelerating gains from cooperation in agriculture, trade, infrastructure, and governance are an example of what has been called a 'major transition' in evolution, during which human beings went from being a social species like chimpanzees to being an 'ultrasocial' species, like bees and ants, able to live in groups of thousands with substantial division of labor.
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IA norms (and cognitive dispositions) played (and play) the important role of suppressing selfishness by making people loyal (at least superficially) to their tribal organization and the authorities which organize it. The appeal to the advantage of IA norms in a scenario of intertribal competition provides an explanation for why we have IA norms and supporting emotions that are more pervasive than those of our primate cousins.
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Purity norms were also plausibly heuristics for welfare promotion. As early humans evolved an ever-elaborate mechanism of disgust, especially as they began to eat meat some 1.5 million years ago. 43 As Daniel Kelly has argued, the disgust response was later plausibly co-opted to play sundry motivational roles, including reinforcing norms relating to ceremonial, spiritual, sexual, and ethnic purity (e.g., sexual taboos against incest, intermarriage, sacrilege, and ceremonial impurity). 44 Here again, however, the evolutionary contribution of disgust and of purity norms is the protection of the welfare of the bodies and minds of individuals. 41 Haidt & Kesebir, 'Morality', p. 809. Numerous citations have been removed from this quotation. 42 As Haidt & Kesebir explain (p. 810), 'there is no evidence that any non -human animal feels shame or guilt about violating such norms -only fear of punishment (Boehm, in press). Humans, in contrast, live in a far denser web of norms, mores, and folkways . . . and have an expanded suite of emotions related to violations, whether committed by others (e.g., anger, contempt, and disgust) or by the self (e.g., shame, embarrassment, and guilt)'. 43 where stable democracy is possible, there happens to be less need for rigid, involuntary, or non-meritocratic hierarchy as a means of preventing insubordination. Thus, there is less need for the kinds of harmful oppression that often result from giving too much power to a small set of persons. As for Purity: science now gives us much more accurate information about the spread of real contagions and many means of preventing them. There is no longer need or support for beliefs in literal impurities involved in behaviors such as sex and improper ritual.
However, IAP norms are not useless. They can still be useful rules of thumb for us today in places like battlefields, offices, and high schools: much harm is reduced through loyalty to friends, respect for teachers, and mitigation of promiscuous or adulterous sexual experimentation. (We will finish this thought in §4.)
To show how this iconoclasm is justified, I will now answer two key questions, hoping to show that welfare promotion's moral importance is intrinsic, but that that of IAP norms is merely extrinsic.
Questions about the normative force of Harm and IAP
1. What's the big deal about welfare? §2 tried to show that if anything matters morally, it is welfare (the welfare of whoever it is who turns out to matter). This is a priori plausible, and even conservatives seem to agree about this in various ways. But here it is very natural to ask, 'why is welfare important?' This question is at least doubly ambiguous.
A first version of the question is, 'why should we think anything at all, including welfare, matters morally?' We must delegate this question to papers in which there is room to defend moral realism. 45 Here we are only concerned with discerning what would matter morally if anything did. Even if morality turn out to be a fiction or a construction, the contention is that human nature forces us to adopt a standpoint on which welfare-promoting norms are central to morality whereas IAP norms are merely derivative.
A second version of the question is, 'is it a brute fact that welfare matters morally, or can this fact be helpfully explained?' A promising account can be roughly sketched here, as x is a basic harm ↔ the overwhelming majority of subjects, as they actually are in this world now, have a basic aversion to x.
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Basic benefits might be thought to count as such either (complementarily) in virtue of tending to elicit basic attractions in actual vertebrate earthlings, or rather simply in virtue of how justify enduring certain basic harms. In any case, the term 'harm' seems to be typically used as a way of referring (rigidly) to a class of states of affairs including at least the basic harms. Here it might be worried that liberals are similarly subject to debunking arguments in their characteristic moral judgments; after all this theory holds that, they, too, are 'intuitive lawyers'. However, the point of §2 was that there is less need to provide any deeper justification for welfare-promotion norms. They help form an explanatory bedrock for morality, and even conservatives are committed to this claim. The analog of part [i] of the epistemic premise does not apply to intuitions that harming is wrong, so that part [ii] of that premise (which is merely a 'bonus' explanatory feature) does not 'kick in' to exacerbate any debunking.
Vindicating Durkheimian Welfarism
Haidt is ambivalent about conservative morality. His work is mostly descriptive; he emphasizes how IAP norms are a useful and overlooked aspect of the norms about which humans moralize as a matter of (pre-) historical fact. Yet he does take a normative ethical position, endorsing a form of utilitarianism (at least for public policies in modern, diverse societies), and he admits this is a liberal view. 53 However, Haidt says the theory of the human good which we should plug in is 'Durkheimian' in holding that 'human flourishing requires social order and embeddedness' and that 'social order is extraordinarily precious and difficult to achieve', as well as holding that there are a plurality of values, some of which require a great deal of sympathy and empathy to understand. 54 However, Haidt offers no argument for this utilitarianism, and apparently thinks his value pluralism follows from his work's observation that IAP virtues and norms enrich and bind humans into persisting groups that they find important.
The account and arguments given above begin to support a 'Durkheimian' form of welfarism, according to which the following claims hold:
[1] Welfare promotion (especially harm prevention) is the ultimate goal of all moral rules, ideals, and virtues;
[2] IAP norms and virtues are in most human environments desirable yet overridable heuristics for promoting welfare for humans in their communities;
[3] 'Welfare' is to be construed broadly enough to cover certain desire-dependent interests, as well as various kinds of (un)freedom, ((un) fair) opportunity, and (in)ability;
[4] There is a great deal of variety in which sorts of benefits (and other goods) it is rational for people to pursue, and a great deal of latitude regarding which sorts of benefits can rationally compensate for which kinds of harms.
53 He calls utilitarianism a 'one-receptor system', i.e., one which takes harm to be the supremely important moral concept. grounded?) and (if vulnerability-grounded), whether the harm is an instance(s) of pain, death, disability, injury, or illness of non-metaphorical sorts.
Far from oversimplifying ethics, the Durkheimian welfarist picture of morality allows us to make slow, steady progress on discerning which human norms are really relevant to the moral claims we are inclined to make, simplifying things just enough that substantive, yet difficult, debates about tradeoffs in welfare can take place. 
